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a call to resist illegitimate authority 
WHAT KIND OF 
PEACE 
MOVEMENT? 
Since its beginnings in 1967, Resist has been primarily 
an anti-war organization. And our funding has reflected 
this: in 1981, for example, 38 out of 72 grants went to 
peace or anti-draft organizations. 
Yet we have always been conscious of the need to give 
strong support to organizations working in other areas: 
civil liberties, social justice, labor, feminism, and anti-
racism. This reflects the view that not only are such 
movements important in themselves, but that our 
efforts to build the peace movement can not be success-
ful unless we are also successful in creating a broad 
movement against "illegitimate authority" in all aspects 
of life. 
The growing danger. of war, and the consequent 
annihilation of our civilization raises the question of 
whether it is wise to continue to spread our resources 
across much of the spectrum of our movement's work, 
rather than to concentrate our energy and funds on anti-
war work alone. It certainly can be argued, and is being 
argued, that the issue of survival is fundamental, and 
that all of our political hopes will be ended if the arms 
race is not brought quickly into check. Shouldn't we 
concentrate our forces, creating the largest possible 
coalition for nuclear disarmament? Aren't other issues 
diversions, or sources of disunity that should be tempor-
arily put on the shelf. until survival is assured? 
These questions do not allow for a simple answer, and 
yet Resist must address them in a practical way each 
time we decide how to allocate our grant money. Our 
present understanding is that the peace movement has 
no choice but to see itself as part of a broad progressive 
movement if it is to achieve its goals. The sources of 
violence and potential nuclear destruction are deep, and 
do not depend on a particular set of leaders who occupy 
positions of power. For peace to be assured we must 
make substantial progress in limiting the concentration 
of power in the hands of the rich, in dismantling hier-
archies of domination and exploitation, and in combat-
ting ideologies of inequality, white supremacy, and anti-
feminism. Failing to address these issues will tend to 
limit anti-war activity to those for whom they are of 
little importance, and prevent us from becoming a 





The organizers of the demonstrations scheduled next 
June to coincide with the UN Special Session on Dis-
armament recently made an important decision. Faced 
with proposals to include issues of US intervention 
prominently in the demonstrations, the organizers voted 
these proposals down. The focus of the demonstrations 
will continue to be on the danger of the nuclear arms 
race and the enormous drain on human resources it 
causes. 
While these are obviously important - life and death 
- issues, the decision raises some important questions. 
First, can the issues really be separated? What is the 
linkage in the real world between nuclear war and 
conventional . war, whether intervention into Third 
World conflicts or a "conventional" war between 
nuclear powers? And second, does this emphasis on 
nuclear weapons alone really help build, and not divide, 
the peace movement? For it is argueq that a focus on 
nuclear weapons is not only appropriate because of their 
danger, but that including other issues such as US inter-
vention would be divisive within the consensus that is 
emerging about the threat of nuclear war. And hanging 
over this discussion is the dramatic growth of the peace· 
movement in Europe, where a single focus - no nuclear 
weapons, East or West - has organized massive 
demonstrations against war. Wouldn't a similar focus 
create a mass movement here as well? 
In the first place, this is not Europe, and it makes no 
sense whatsoever to derive the goals of the US peace 
movement from the experience of the peace movement 
in Britain or the Netherlands. We live in the heartland 
of not only the nuclear weapons power, but the imperial 
gendarme as well. It is our nation that has inflicted so 
much suffering on countries of the Middle East, South-
east Asia, and now Central America, and we have a 
moral obligation to do what we can to stop it. It is all 
very well to be mobilized for peace when our cities are 
threatened with destruction, and ourselves and our 
friends threatened with instant or lingering death. But 
death and destruction are no less real when they are 
inflicted by our armies or those of our surrogates on the 
(continued on oaac 2) 
peasant populations of the Third World, even if no 
nuclear warheads are involved. The point is that this 
demonstration is occuring in the US, organized by the 
US peace movement, and it is irrational bordering on 
racist to limit our disarmament demands to those 
weapons that threaten the white populations of the 
world, while leaving unchallenged those used daily to 
kill darker skinned peoples. 
Secondly, what is divisive and what is unifying about 
different demands for disarmament? The peace move-
ment needs to think this through quickly, for the rapid 
growth of our ranks is electrifying. Each week finds a 
new "professionals for social responsibility" organiza-
tion springing up. We are daily made aware of new 
people, new sectors of people who have never been 
touched by the peace movement and are now terrified 
about the dangers of nuclear war. Yet we would be blind 
not to see that this popular movement for peace is grow-
ing across a wide spectrum, and is not confined simply 
to the issues of nuclear weapons. We can see that the 
fear of widespread popular opposition is suppressing 
the Reagan Administration's natural inclinations in 
Central America, and that the periodic sputterings of 
the anti-draft movement have served notice on the 
Administration that this issue is trouble, and one better 
postponed until after the 1982 elections . Yet it seems 
likely that Haig and Co. will find itself with little choice 
but to rush more US aid to prop up the military regime 
in El Salvador this spring. And the Administration has 
no choice but to proceed with the prosecution (now 
scheduled to begin in March) of those young men who 
failed or refused to register for the draft. Both Admini-
stration moves can be expected to tap the latent energies 
of strong movements for peace, which have proven their 
vigor in the past with quick, dramatic outpourings of 
opposition to the government. Wouldn't the Special 
Session demonstration organizers be wise to anticipate 
such a mobilization this spring and reach out to include 
its energies in the campaign against nuclear weapons? 
Can this be done while rejecting the proposal to include 
the issue of intervention in a disarmament focus, or 
when the issue of the draft is scarcely mentioned? 
What about the real world connection between nuclear 
weapons and conventional warfare? Particularly at a 
time when the peace movement is growing so quickly, 
experienced leaders have an obligation to educate new 
recruits to our ranks, and fill them in on our best efforts 
to get at the root causes of the arms race. This is particu-
larly important in the linkage between conventional and 
nuclear war, because a substantial sector of "informed 
opinion" now says that we need to bolster our conven-
tional forces in Europe in order not to be so dependent 
on nuclear weapons. If we are serious about lessening 
the possibility that nuclear weapons be used, goes this 
argument, we would bring back the draft, step up our 
chemical warfare capabilities, and build a lot of tanks. 
We know that this connection between conventional 
and nuclear warfare is at least a half truth, and that the 
most likely scenario for nuclear war is one which 
emerges from a conventional clash in Central Europe. 
But the best guessing is that such a clash would itself 
grow out of a US-Soviet clash in the Third World; and 
what information is available shows that many of the 
occasions when the US contemplated using nuclear 
weapons in the past grew out of real or alleged super-
power conflict in the Third World. 
The connection between nuclear and conventional 
warfare also works the other way. The drive by the US 
to regain clear nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union 
is primarily intended to give the US a free hand in the 
Third World, particularly in areas close to the Soviet 
Union such as the Persian Gulf. Only if the level of US 
military superiority is clear at each possible stage of 
escalation, reasons the Pentagon, will the Soviet Union 
refrain from challenging a US intervention that uses 
conventional forces. This was the pattern set in Korea 
artd Vietnam, but one which has been challenged by the 
''essential equivalency'' in nuclear arms that the Soviets 
achieved in the 1970s. Nuclear superiority is the umbrel-
la under which the US will police or expand its sphere of 
influence, using the Rapid Deployment Force. This was 
the clear message of the Carter Doctrine, which threat-
ened to use nuclear weapons if the Soviets challenged 







If this outline is accepted then it is vital that the 
struggle for peace not be divided into "ban the bomb" 
and anti-interventionist forces. These struggles are 
linked not just in our minds, but in the minds of the 
Pentagon as well. The organizers of the demonstrations 
around the UN Special Session on Disarmament are 
playing a divisive role in the peace movement by separ-
ating these issues. They are linked whether we like it or 
not, and the job of organizers is to educate people about 
reality. If it is too late to persuade the organizers in New 
York to emphasize the dangers of conventional warfare, 
US intervention or the draft in relationship to nuclear 
war, we should try to take up these issues at the local 
level, and make the UN Special Session on Disarmament 
an occasion to work for a genuine, secure peace. 
OUR STAKE IN 
SOLIDARITY 
FRANK BRODHEAD 
The military coup in Poland and the suppression of 
the Polish labor movement have aroused widespread 
opposition around the world. Little of this opposition 
has focused on the specific character and demands of 
Solidarity, however. In consequence protests against the 
coup have had a largely nationalist character, and have 
not distanced themselves from the anti-Soviet rhetoric 
of the Reagan Administration. Indeed, we now have the 
irony of the most anti-labor Administration in memory 
leading the defence of one of the most radical labor 
movements in our time. 
Or is it a radical movement? The· Polish movement is 
clearly nationalist and clearly Catholic. It is also "anti-
communist," or at least anti- the kind of ideology and 
society that passes for "Communism" in the official 
press of both East and West. For these reasons Solidar-
ity has gained at least the verbal support of conservative 
Western governments and leaders; and for these reasons 
as well sections of the Western left denounce Solidarity 
as misguided at best, and at worst as the spearhead of a 
US-backed plot to re-establish capitalism in Eastern 
Europe. 
It is important that we characterize Solidarity correct-
ly, for it is daily becoming more apparent that the East-
West conflict will continue to be exacerbated by the 
situation in Poland, with potentially disasstrous 
consequences. A good understanding of Solidarity is 
particularly important for Americans, because if the 
situation in Poland continues to deteriorate, and if the 
Soviet Union becomes more overtly involved in the 
suppression of Polish labor, the Reagan Administration 
will seize the opportunity to divert attention from the 
failure of its own economic program, rally the country 
around a nationalist military builqup, and greatly 
increase the dangers of war. 
There is another reason as well to attempt to under-
stand Solidarity better. I believe that it has some lessons 
to teach the West, particularly the Western labor move-
ments, because Poland represents the advance guard of 
a more general crisis of modern societies. This crisis is 
worldwide, rippling out of its twin centers - the US and 
the USSR - and eddying into the backwaters of the 
spheres of influence of both powers. This is a crisis of 
economies built on the "extermination industry," as 
E. P. Thompson has called it, economies which now 
collectively channel half a trillion dollars a year into 
military, waste production. With both economies evolv-
ing new governing bureaucracies based on military pro-
duction - the so-called "Iron Triangle in the US, its 
counterpart in the USSR - the tenure of the managers 
of the "extermination industry" appears increasingly 
secure against appeals to consider the "general 
interests" of society. Witness the ineffectual pleas of 
Wall St. about the deficit and the military budget. 
How can we challenge these twin bureaucracies? How 
can we stop this madness? Clearly we are up against 
forces so powerful (and so heavily armed!) that only a 
massive, popular revolutionary movement will have a 
chance. The decisive battles will be fought in the messy 
metropolis, not by romantic peasant armies in the 
hinterland. It is to movements like Solidarity, not those 
like the Sandinistas, that we must look for lessons on 
the way forward. Today the collapse occurs in Poland, 
and the Polish workers build Solidarity. Tomorrow we 
can expect the workers of Britain, Brazil, or Roumania 
to find themselves with no choice but to take matters 
into their own hands. We need to consciously begin to 
build the political and intellectual infrastructure that 
will help prepare Americans for the day when we will 
have to create a "Solidarity" movement of our own. 
SOLIDARITY TRANSFORMED 
The history of Solidarity is that of an organization 
transformed from one maintaining that it was only a 
trade union, and had no "political" interests, to one 
which began to assume responsibility for the whole 
·society. In the end Solidarity became an alternative 
government-in-waiting, lacking only the tolerance of its 
neighbors for it to simply announce that the old regime 
was abolished and a new one had taken its place. 
How was this transformation accomplished? In many 
respects it was latent in Solidarity's origins. First there 
was the question of democracy. Emerging from a 
general strike in August 1980, Solidarity developed a 
style of work in which negotiations were broadcast to 
the entire workforce, and in which decisions were 
preceded by lengthy discussion in search of a consensus. 
No more "leaders of the people" to give orders. As a 
consequence accurate information became a common 
objective of the workers' movement, and in the months 
ahead workers would fight for the end of censorship, 
and a vigorous press would lauch 600 different Solidar-
ity publications alone. 
Secondly, there were the demands themselves. In 
August 1980 the shipyard workers in Gdansk forced the 
government to agree to their now-famous twenty-one 
point program. Heading the list were the demands for 
independent trade unions and the right to strike. On the 
basis of these two demands, reasoned the workers, all 
else could be accomplished. Yet their remaining 
demands clearly indicated that though theirs was in 
form a trade-union struggle, in essence it recognized 
that in a modern, state-dominated economy and society 
there is little real distinction between "political" and 
"economic" demands. The Polish workers, for 
example, demanded a reduction of privileges for police 
and Party officials, pay raises that would narrow the 
wages gap within the working class itself, and improve-
ments in daycare, maternity leaves, and housing. They 
demanded not only that strike leaders be let out of 
prison, but that intellectuals and others who were jailed 
because they aided the workers' struggles be released as 
well. They demanded that honest information about 
their struggle be broadcast to the entire nation, and that 
corrupt officials be replaced. 
Finally, the form of self-organization of the strikers 
foretold what was to come. Led by the shipyard 
workers, the workers in the Gdansk area formed a strike 
committee representing all the plants, all the workers in 
the region. This form was copied by workers in other 
regions of Poland, and at the end of the strike the 
regional strike committees formed a loose national 
structure, Solidarity. Thus at the outset Solidarity was 
prepared to represent all the population, not just 
workers in particular crafts, plants, or industries. Its 
structure mirrored that of the Party and the government 
itself. 
The potential latent in the August struggle was soon 
realized. While the Western press gave prominence to 
the role of religion and the Church, and to the person-
ality of Walesa, workers concerned themselves with 
questions of production and workers' rights. Would the 
Gdansk Agreement be implemented at the local level? 
What about wage increases? Would the police beating 
of union activists go unpunished? What about a five-
day workweek? Would Solidarity be allowed to deter-
mine its own organizational structure and constitutional 
form? In each of these cases and others, Polish workers 
were forced to use or threaten to use the strike weapon 
to settle their grievances. They had no other weapons at 
hand: elections, parliamentary lobbying, compulsory 
arbitration and grievance procedures - the staples of 
the Western labor movement were closed to them. 
Direct action, not representative action in a Congress or 
behind the scenes, was forced on the workers if they 
were to pursue their struggle at all. And thanks to Soli-
darity's regional structure, each successive struggle 
became a massive teach-in, a program of public educa-
tion showing how struggles were connected, and that 
victory depended on labor solidarity. An injury to one 
was everybody's business. 
By the summer of 1981 it had become increasingly 
clear that the economy was headed for disaster. No 
more credits could be obtained from abroad, and West-
ern banks had pulled a billion dollars in deposits out of 
Polish banks. No more food or raw materials or spare 
parts or replacement machinery could be imported. Pro-
duction bottlenecks became more acute, as essential 
components or raw materials could not be found to 
finish a product, in turn depriving some other produc-
tion process of a necessary step. Everything that could 
be exported was, in order to earn precious hard currency 
to repay Poland's debts, resulting in tremendous short-
ages. Demonstrations and then riots agairtst the short-
ages began to break out. Solidarity, indeed all of 
Poland, began to realize that if the economic crisis were 
not resolved, their society might disintegrate. 
But how was this to be done? Only a massive mobil-
ization of effort could reverse the nation's economic 
decline. Who could have any faith however, in those 
who had already mismanaged their local factory or the 
entire nation's economy? At the local level, Solidarity 
activists pushed for the right to select their own man-
agers, and achieved a number of important successes. 
At the national level, however, Solidarity was less 
successful in forcing the government to share with it 
decision-making power over the nation's economy. 
Instead the government wanted Solidarity to share the 
responsibility for a regime of austerity. "They want us 
to pull our load, like workhorses," said the workers. 
"But we want to hold the reins as well, so that they 
won't take any more wrong turns." 
In attempting to solve this impasse, Solidarity hit 
upon an ingenious plan, but a revolutionary one in the 
eyes of the government. In the summer and fall of 1981 
they worked out a plan to directly administer a portion 
of the society's production and distribution. They 
would do this by working on the "free Saturdays" that 
their earlier struggles had achieved. But they would do 
so only under rule of the workers themselves. "We are 
not donating these Saturdays to the authorities," they 
said, "but to ourselves. Insofar as we do so we are here 
and now inaugurating the principles of self-manage-
'44 '56 '68 '70 
ment.'' They proposed that on Saturdays each factory 
would be administered by its factory commission or 
committee for self-management. The additional 
production thus achieved would also be administered 
by the workers themselves. "If Polish society responds 
to our appeal," concluded their resolution, "then Soli-
darity must do everything to keep all extra production 
under constant scrutiny in order that the increased 
efforts of working people not be wasted. This will con-
stitute the first great test of the constructive power of 
employees' self-management.'' 
If this plan had been implemented it would have given 
Solidarity control over the allocation of a sizeable frac-
tion of the nation's output of basic goods, and thus a 
foothold toward the union's goal of "socializing" the 
planning process. But of course it was not to be. Con-
fronted with the choice of either sharing power or crush-
ing Solidarity, the regime chose the course of repres-
sion. The deployment of small squads of soldiers to the 
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countryside, the arrest and harassment of union mili-
tants, the deliberate aggravation of the food crisis, and 
other moves by the regime we can now see were prepara-
tory steps to the military coup. 
JUNTA SOCIALISM 
The military coup of mid-December is not the end of 
the struggle of the Polish people, but the beginning of a 
new chapter in that struggle. Many things are now lost: 
the renewal of civic life and voluntary organizations, a 
flourishing press and the transformation of universities 
into centers of intellectual inquiry. Also gone is any 
lingering trust in the authorities and confidence in the 
military, trusts which always struck Western observers 
as overly credulous, but ones which were affirmed again 
and again by Polish citizens. The most important loss, 
of course, is the beachhead of legal space achieved by 
Solidarity's nonnegotiable demands in August 1980: 
free and independent trade unions, and the right to 
strike. 
The centrality of workplace organization for Solidar-
ity can be seen in the initial response to the military 
coup. While Western reporters strained from the 
confines of their hotel windows to see large, open-air 
demonstrations in the streets of Warsaw - and failing 
to see them reported little resistance to the coup - the 
Polish people chose to organize their self-defense 
around the workplaces where Solidarity was born and 
where it retained its organizational focus. A report from 
the Polish Workers' Task Force in late December, for 
example, said that 200 plants were occupied throughout 
Poland, and that at 700 plants workers were not let in to 
work. In many cases there were reports of family and 
community supporters massing outside the plants or 
mines to block the police attack. Though workers also 
attempted to defend Solidarity headquarters and to 
organize street demonstrations in some areas, the most 
significant form of resistance was factory occupation. 
The Church was a place of refuge, but not a center for 
self-defence. 
This should not be surprising. Factory occupations 
are a uniquely twentieth-century form of working class 
self-defense, representing the endurance of anarcho-
syndicalist tendencies in the modern labor movement. 
That the Polish workers chose to adopt it helps us to see 
the link between their struggle and the great strikes in 
northern Italy in 1920, the sit-in strikes in Detroit in 
1936-37, the factory occupations in France in 1968, or 
the cordones in Chile in 1972-73. In each case workers 
built a community of struggle and self-governance with-
in and around the great concentrations of capital and 
industry. So much the center of daily life in "normal" 
times, the factory became a fortress where the most 
expensive machinery in the nation was held hostage, 
insurance against the potential violence of the state. 
Each of these occupations, as well as those in Poland, of 
course had different outcomes; and it is perhaps signifi-
cant that the only clear success occurred in Detroit, 
where the goals of the struggle were modest - union 
recognition - and not sufficiently threatening to the 
state power to justify the use of overwhelming armed 
force. 
What makes Poland's future so grim is that the 
authorities seem to have chosen with uncanny skill a 
method for regaining control of society which is guaran-
teed to exacerbate the Polish crisis. Given a decade of 
economic mismanagement and investment policies 
which in retrospect are seen as insane, and given the 
international economic straitjacket in which Poland 
now finds itself, any hope for recovery must rest on 
mobilizing the enthusiasm and productive initiative of 
vast numbers of people. Only a program which clearly 
shares austerity on an equitable basis, and which offers 
hope for the future, can enlist the creative capacities of 
people to the extent necessary for national recovery. 
Instead, the authorities have chosen to destroy the net-
works and fabric of informal relationships around 
which productive work is really carried out. By destroy-
ing Solidarity the authorities have rejected any accom-
modation with the accumulated experience that such 
networks have achieved over the past quarter century, 
of which Solidarity was the expression and the outcome. 
What alternative to workers' control do the Polish 
authorities present as a means to reorganize the labor 
force and raise the level of production? A week after the 
military coup there was a meeting between representa-
tives of the government and the top managers of the 
thirty largest factories in Poland to address this ques-
tion. According to a memo prepared by a government 
representative and published in Solidarity's under-
ground Information Bulletin, the meeting concluded 
that "It is absolutely necessary to institute reform, 
immediately. We cannot allow the creation of a vacuum 
in the wake of the ... suppression of trade unions. In 
the factories in the future, trade unions and workers 
self-government should be created. In the majority of 
factories, however, the composition of these self-




Zenon Januszewski, Polish Workers Party, 1942-1962 
tion of winning the trust of the workforce is: the 
improvement of the quality of propaganda, and 
conducting a dialogue with the workers." Yet how can 
this be done, now that Polish workers understand what 
real self-governance is, and now that they have exper-
ienced the junta's chosen method of "dialogue?" 
Some indication of the government's strategy 
appeared in early February. According to US newspaper 
reports, the Polish authorities were considering reorgan-
izing trade unions along industrial and professional 
lines, rather than the regional federations organized by 
Solidarity. The government's goal will be to encourage a 
new trade-union structure that isolates workers from 
each other, rather than allowing the workplaces to serve 
as foci of class-wide regional organizations as before. In 
a statement that would warm Lane Kirkland's heart, 
government spokesman Jerzy Urban asked, "What 
interests, for instance, do a shoemaker and a pilot have 
in common? Sharing a territory doesn't mean they have 
common interests." 
The Polish workers have a different viewpoint. They 
are well aware that for the immediate future their coop-
eration and even enthusiasm at the workplace is neces-
sary to end Poland's economic crisis. And, as before, 
they will decline to participate on the basis of the terms 
offered them by the authorities. A clear indication of 
this can be seen in a document called "Basic Principles 
of Resistance,'' printed in Solidarity's Information Bul-
letin No. 8 (December 28, 1981). The document outlines 
a plan of guerilla warfare that combines the slowdown 
and work-to-rule tactics known to trade unionists 
throughout the world with injunctions to maintain the 
levels of comradeship and mutual aid necessary to 
survive the repression. "Eagerly carry out even the most 
idiotic orders,'' urges the document. ''Do not solve 
problems on your own. Throw that task onto the shoul-
ders of commissars and informers ..... Sooner or later 
the commissar will want to be left in peace. THIS WILL 
MARK THE BEGINNING OF THE END OF DIC-
TATORSHIP." 
This is the formula for a protracted struggle between 
the Polish people and their state, centered around a des-
perate attempt by the authorities to extract a greater 
level of production and efficiency from a workforce 
which has made it a matter of class and national pride 
not to cooperate. The suffering and rebellion that will 
surely follow can only lead to a police state, and to 
continued danger and instability in Central Europe. 
Both the peace movement and the Left in the US will be 
faced with extremely strong pressures to treat Poland as 
strictly a Cold War issue, and will find many within our 
own ranks who will portray the Polish workes as simply 
the victims of either Western bankers or of Soviet agres-
sion. There will be little space given us to present the 
Polish people as the subjects of history as well as the 
objects of fate, as seekers after a path of radical change 
and self-governance that continues and helps expand the 
tradition of libertarian workers movements in this cen-
tury. Yet we must seize this space and enlarge it, for it 
allows us to argue that the Polish workers movement 
has much to teach us in the West, and that learned prop-
erly its lessons will help us to find a genuine path 
through the crisis of our time. 
RESOURCES 
Committee in Support of Solidarity, 275 Seventh Ave., 
New York, NY 10011. 
"Who Are the Workers in Polish Solidarity - and 
What Do They Want?", an excellent pamphlet by 
Andrej Tymowski. Available for $0.50 from Common-




The "Intelligence Identities Protection Act" is 
working its way through Congress (H.R. 4; S. 391), and 
few Americans are aware of the very real threat which it 
poses to Freedom of Speech and Freedom of the Press. 
Scores of constitutional law experts have said that it is 
clearly unconstitutional, but its sponsors suggest leaving 
that problem to the courts. Even the author of the 
House version, Rep. Boland (Dem.-Mass.), has admitted 
that the bill "could subject a private citizen to criminal 
prosecution for disclosing unclassified information 
obtained from unclassified sources." 
This bill represents an Official Secrets Act, and 
citizens must be aware of the myths which surround the 
public perception of the bill. These myths have been 
created by the constant references to the bill as the 
"Names of Agents Act" or the "Anti-Agee Act" or the 
"bill to get the Covert Action Information Bulletin." 
None of these characterizations is accurate. We hope 
that the following information will help people to speak 
out against this bill, to urge its defeat. 
• The bill covers unclassified material. People believe 
this bill deals only with releasing information which is 
obtained from classified material. There is nothing in 
the bill which limits its scope in this way. In fact, it is 
specifically designed to suppress revelations derived 
purely from unclassified material. It prohibits the dis-
closure of " any information that identifies an individ-
ual as a covert agent." This applies even if the informa-
tion comes from a book on a library shelf, or from a 
newspaper published anywhere, or from a chance 
remark overheard in the hallway. 
• The bill covers the FBI, military intelligence, and 
other agencies, as well as the CIA. Many people think 
the bill applies only to the disclosure of undercover CIA 
officers. This is not true. Most significantly, it also 
applies to the ''foreign counterintelligence and counter-
terrorism components" of the FBI, as well as to the 
intellignece divisions of the military services, and all the 
other intelligence agencies, such as the National Security 
Agency. This bill would prevent an organization from 
exposing and expelling an FBI informer discovered in its 
midst, even if discovered through entirely legal and 
open means. 
• The bill is not limited to the exposure of govern-
ment employees. The bill does not merely cover CIA 
case officers or FBI undercover agents. It covers present 
and former government employees, agents, informants, 
and what are called "sources of operational assist-
ance.'' Under the bill, for example, the famous 
Washington Post story which disclosed that the CIA 
had been making annual payments to King Hussein of 
Jordan would be criminal. Many articles about the CIA 
connections of the Watergate conspirators would have 
been unlawful. 
• The bili-is not even limited to ''names.' ' Supporters 
of the bill suggest that since it deals with "names of 
agents" it should not affect mainstream journalists, 
because one can expose an illegal or immoral operation 
without having to name the names of the individuals 
involved. This is also untrue. The bill speaks of "infor-
mation that identifies" an undercover operative or 
source. As any journalist knows, it is almost impossible 
to present information which exposes some operation 
without giving away some information from which one 
could deduce the identities of the people involved. 
• The bill virtually eliminates "whistleblowing" in 
the intelligence field. The experience of the last several 
years certainly teaches that if there is any area of 
government susceptible to horrendous abuses it is the 
field of intelligence. This bill will have the effect of 
eliminating the possibility of ''whistleblowing'' by 
anyone in the intelligence field, because, as pointed out 
above, exposures of abuses, even grossly illegal activi-
ties, would invariably involve "information that iden-
tifies" some undercover people. 
• The alleged protections and limitations in the bill 
are meaningless. Much talk has been made of the idea 
that the bill is really designed only to "get" publications 
like the Covert Action Information Bulletin. Main-
stream, or "legitimate" journalists would not be 
affected. But the language does not bear that out, and, 
obviously, prosecutors will prosecute whom they wish 
when they wish . The House bill applies to "whoever, in 
the course of an effort to identify and expose covert 
agents with the intent to impair or impede the foreign 
intelligence activities of the United States ... .. " The 
Senate version applies to ''whoever, in the course of a 
pattern of activities intended to identify and expose 
covert agents and with reason to believe that such 
activities would impair or impede the foreign intelli-
gence activities of the United States .... " Neither of 
these clauses affords any real protection. The CIA and 
other intelligence agencies have stated many times that 
the disclosure of any of its personnel or operations 
impedes its effectiveness. Anyone writing an intelli-
gence-related story would be aware of that. (When the 
Post was considering the King Hussein story, the White 
House actually interceded, trying to get the editor to 
spike the story, stressing that its publication would 
impair US intelligence in the Middle East. Under this 
bill, that would surely have set the stage for criminal 
prosecution.) What might constitute a "course of an 
effort to identify" or a "pattern of activities intended to 
identify" is unclear, but it would not take much. 
Researching a series of articles, or perhaps even a single 
article, would probably suffice. Trying to root out the 
informers in one's group would surely be enough. The 
notion that this bill has any safeguards whatsoever is 
another myth. 
This bill must be stopped. Write your Congressional 
representative; write letters to your newspaper; explain 
what this bill really means. Too few people understand. 
The United States cannot afford an Official Secrets Act 
especially in these times. ' 
For more information write: Covert Action Informa-
tion Bulletin, PO Box 59272, Washington, DC 20004. 
GRANTS 
THE BLACK UNITED FRONT (415 Atlantic Avenue, 
Brooklyn, NY 11217) 
The issue of police brutality has a long and bloody 
history in the black community of New York City. The 
decade of the seventies saw a marked increase in cases of 
police abuse of authority and use of deadly force against 
African-Americans, especially young people. The BUF 
originally became active during what is known as the 
"Bloody Summer of '78 ." Since then they have played a 
major role in organizing black and Hispanic 
neighborhoods, helping to form coalitions and 
participating in lobbying efforts to win greater recog-
nition of police repression. The Police Brutality 
Investigative Unit of the BUF has received wide acclaim 
from many community groups because it provides the 
city's only source of information about citizens' rights 
in cases of arrest and police abuse. The group has 
prepared leaflets and brochures, outlining what 
constitutes police brutality and instructing citizens on 
procedures in such cases. They have also developed and 
screened the first factual slideshows on riots and the use 
of deadly police force. The PBIU Newsletter is also used 
for citizen information on brutality and for document- 1 
ing case histories of police abuse. Resist's grant was to 
buy office and newsletter supplies. 
COALITION FOR BASIC HUMAN NEEDS (10 West 
Street, Boston, MA 02111) 
The CBHN is a welfare rights organization currently 
fighting against the proposed Community Work Exper-
ience, commonly known as "workfare." The plan 
would allow the Massachusetts Department of Public 
Welfare to require welfare mothers to "work off" their 
welfare grants and food stamp allotments as a condition 
of receiving public aid. Approximately 60,000 families 
would be affected. Workfare is not a job; it is forced, 
unpaid labor. It would allow a woman no choice over 
where she is placed, what she does, or even when she 
works. She would receive no benefits, no sick days, no 
vacation. She might be placed alongside union workers 
where she would be a potential unwilling scab. While 
she is working, her children would be placed, not in a 
licensed child care facility, but with another workfare 
mother who is unpaid, untrained, and has not chosen to 
be a daycare provider. Mothers would have little or no 
choice over the home in which children are place, nor 
any guarantee that they would not be abused or neglec-
ted by unwilling babysitters. CBHN has marshalled all 
its forces to fight this plan. By holding demonstrations, 
mobilizing other organizations, and distributing 
volumes of informational materials, they have managed 
to get the program postponed temporarily. Resist is 
helping to sustain their efforts by contributing to liter-
ature costs. 
SELECTIVE SERVICE LAW PANEL (1911 Wilshire 
Boulevard, Los Angeles, CA 90057) 
The SSLP was formed as a project of the National 
Lawyers Guild in the mid 1960s to train lawyers and lay 
counselors in draft and Selective Service law, and to 
develop legal and political strategies for fighting the 
draft. It was revitalized under joint sponsorship of the 
NLG and ACLU in early 1980, after the announcement 
of President Carter's new draft registration program. 
The Panel's aim is to make legal skills accessible to 
minority communities previously left out of the draft 
resistance movement. Along with their mass outreach to 
high schools and junior colleges, SSLP is producing a 
series of videotapes to be broadcast nationwide over 
cable TV. Resist is helping with production costs for one 
video program. Aimed at draft-age men and their 
families, the show will provide basic facts about how the 
draft of the '80s will work and the possible conse-
quences and requirements of various draft-related 
options. Also included will be footage of recruits in 
infantry training, anti-Vietnam war demonstrations, as 
well as images of military build-up. So far, cable 
stations in five different areas have agreed to air the 
tape when it is completed. 
CLERGY AND LAITY CONCERNED and COALI-
TION OPPOSING REGISTRATION AND THE 
DRAFT (795 Willamette, Room 302, Eugene, OR 
97401) 
CALC of Lane County is an interfaith organization 
actively working on human rights and disarmament 
issues. Along with staffing a high school outreach 
program, they serve as a resource center and provide 
printed and audiovisual materials to schools, churches, 
and community groups. About three years ago CALC 
helped with the formation of CORD. Currently, the two 
organizations share an office and work together often, 
especially in interracial outreach. Last year CORD 
received a grant from Resist for the purchase of a tele-
phone answering machine, which has greatly helped 
both counseling and the general cohesiveness of the 
organization. This time Resist is helping both groups 
with an outreach program to minority communities 
concerning the draft and the role of the military in 
society. The program will include a slideshow and film 
series, distribution of an informational brochure in 
English and Spanish, and draft counseling advertise-
ments in Spanish. 
THE RESIST PLEDGE SYSTEM 
The most important source of our income is monthly 
pledges . Pledges help us to plan ah_ead by stabilizing 
our monthly income. In addition to receiving the news-
letter, pledges get a monthly reminder letter, containing 
some news of recent grants. If you would like to learn 
more, drop us a note. 
